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The introduction and demise of full-body computed tomography (CT) scanning in Australia: implications 
for preventing overdiagnosis 
ABSTRACT 
Full-body computed tomography (CT) screening came to Australia in 2002.  Within a year, public access to self-
referred full-body CT screening was withdrawn as a consequence of sustained professional and political pressure 
and legislative changes. We examine how self-referred full-body CT scans were made available to Australian 
consumers, and evaluate the social, cultural and system factors that contributed to their de-implementation. Using 
historical methodologies, insider accounts and an ethnographic content analysis of policy documents, statutory 
reports, grey and scholarly literatures, we show how the rapid de-implementation of full-body CT scans in 
Australia arose from interconnected social, cultural and system factors, and an unusual harm profile for the 
technology. In the Australian context, this case suggests that neither single actors nor robust health technology 
assessments are likely to be sufficient to protect people from the unwanted consequences of too much medicine. 
The coordinated interaction of multiple stakeholders achieved this unusual example of successful, early de-
implementation. Each stakeholder exercised their authority within their respective remits to shape public 
perceptions of and access to the new CT screening service: it is possible that without the actions of each, the final 
de-implementation outcome may not have been achieved. These findings are timely, given growing concerns 
about overdiagnosis and the emergence of new forms of testing technologies. Against a background of 
technological optimism and commercial opportunism, a commitment to vigilance and cross-sectoral coordination 
across a range of decision-making roles and institutions will be key to efforts to prevent the harms of 
overdiagnosis. 
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INTRODUCTION   
This paper describes the introduction of self-referred full-body computed tomography (CT) scans as a screening 
technology to Australia’s privately-operated healthcare market in 2002. Dubbed ‘yuppie scans’ because of their 
appeal to wealthy, apparently healthy people, a ‘full’, ‘whole’ or ‘total’ body CT scan – from head to pelvis – 
produces a large amount of image data that may not be visible on a conventional X-ray (Mitchell, 2003). The 
scans were marketed as screening tests for healthy people, not as diagnostic tests for people with symptoms. With 
no need for a doctor’s referral, and at a cost about $900 AUD, anyone could purchase access to this technology 
to screen for a previously undiagnosed or asymptomatic disease (Pollard, 2003; Teutsch, 2002).  
 
Enthusiasm about new health technologies among publics and health professionals tends to run ahead of the 
evidence of benefit, especially if a technology has not previously been in widespread use. The wider acceptance 
or rejection of a health technology can depend on how different technological attributes such as its plausibility, 
visibility, effectiveness, utility, and any attendant risks are perceived by implicated stakeholders. From this 
perspective, how a technology is used (or not) is an ongoing product of sociotechnical practices that iteratively 
create meanings around technologies, and direct them toward the pursuit of specific aims (Ulucanlar, Faulkner, 
Peirce, & Elwyn, 2013). In practice, these ‘technology identities’ can be constructed by interested actors 
(developers, regulators, service providers, consumers, etc.) to shape the purposes and contexts in which a 
technology is permitted to operate. As an example, for screening technologies used to detect prostate cancer risk, 
such as the PSA test and genomic profiling, Alex Faulkner (2012) has  shown that regulators in the UK are 
increasingly diversifying their modes of governance to manage varied uncertainties and risks associated with 
screening technologies. For the PSA test, which attracts significant support from Men’s Health advocates, 
effective governance has relied on the alignment of a rhetoric of consumer empowerment with mandated informed 
decision-making processes that make men responsible for their PSA testing choices. In the contrasting case of 
direct-to-consumer genetic screening, regulators have acted as a traditional evidence-driven gatekeeper of the 
technology, paired more innovatively with a media-focused response, relying on their epistemic authority to 
manage expectations, raise questions about the motivations of providers who are aggressively marketing their 
services, and resist the claims of benefits associated with new and unproven tests.   
 
Informed by theory regarding the construction of technological identities (Ulucanlar et al., 2013), and regarding 
screening regulation as situated, flexible and tailored (Faulkner, 2012), we examine how self-referred full-body 
CT scans were made available to Australian consumers for medical screening, and then, just as rapidly, how they 
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were withdrawn. We evaluate and discuss the social, cultural and system factors and modes of resistance and 
governance that contributed to the de-implementation of this use of a technology. Our aim is to encourage 




While the value of early detection is intuitively appealing, participating in screening can cause harms (Woloshin 
& Schwartz, 2010).  In this case, the harm is increased risk of radiation-induced cancer, not offset by likely 
benefits from screening. A full-body CT scan exposes people to a large amount of ionising radiation, which 
depending on the protocol and CT scanner used can exceed 24 milliSieverts. Regardless of the results, a full-body 
CT scan isthus likely to increase a person’s overall risk of developing cancer. The risk is higher if a person has a 
CT scan at regular intervals because of the large cumulative lifetime dose of ionising radiation (Smith-Bindman, 
2010). In 2002  there was already good evidence that each year 431 cancer cases in Australia were radiation-
induced (de Gonzalez & Darby, 2004), leading to a basic rule for ionising radiation that ‘if you don’t need it, don’t 
have it’.   
 
Whole-body CT scanning did not offer significant benefits to offset these risks. Like other testing technologies, 
CT scan results can deliver false reassurance  (Le Heron & Coakley, 2004). They can also produce false positives, 
it can lead to unnecessary, costly and potentially harmful follow-up investigations. Finally, full-body CT scanning 
carries significant risk of harm arising from overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis occurs when people are diagnosed 
correctly with conditions, but this produces an unfavourable balance of benefits to harms (Carter, Degeling, Doust, 
& Barratt, 2016). Our interest in this  case study is because it is a rare case of an overdiagnosis-causing technology 
that was successfully withdrawn from market. New technologies, or new uses of existing technologies, can often 
contribute to overdiagnosis (Pathirana, Clark, & Moynihan, 2017). When overdiagnosis is occurring, people are 
harmed by being diagnosed correctly but unnecessarily: they meet the criteria (pathological, radiological or 
otherwise) to be diagnosed with the condition, but the condition was unlikely to shorten their life or reduce its 
quality if it had gone undetected. New testing technologies tend to be more sensitive than old technologies, 
increasing the risk of overdiagnosis. The same is true if old tests are used in larger populations of people at 
relatively lower risk: it is likely that more people will be diagnosed with conditions that would never be clinically 
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significant. Because of this, monitoring and potentially withdrawing new screening technologies is one important 
strategy for optimising patient outcomes and healthcare delivery by preventing overdiagnosis.  
 
In Australia, restricting public access to privately operated self-referred full-body CT scans is an oft-cited example 
of a screening technology that caused harm and which was successfully withdrawn. Most of the professional, 
media and political activity that surrounded the introduction of this service occurred in the state of New South 
Wales (NSW) which has a co-regulatory model such that responsibility for oversight of health care practitioners 
and providers is distributed across a few key bodies. Of these there are a number of agencies who were potentially 
relevant to the task of withdrawing self-referred full-body CT scanning from the market (see Supplementary Table 
1). As we will see, some of these agencies were better able to contribute than others to both creating procedural 
barriers to consumer access to the technology, and establishing an unfavourable technological identity for full-
body CT scanning services.  
 
Australia’s health system is a complex mix of public and private provision and funding. Australia has a universal 
healthcare funding system (Medicare). For services to be funded by Medicare, they must pass Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) for safety, efficacy and cost effectiveness via the Medical Services Advisory Committee 
(MSAC). However Australia also has a thriving fee-for-service private healthcare sector which is less constrained 
by HTA; in that sector restrictions on offerings occur largely post-market, in response to complaints or 
surveillance, through medical professional and consumer regulation. CT scanning machines were already an 
established part of medical practice in Australia in the 2000s. Their fee-for-service private use for new indications 
such as screening was not a matter for HTA via MSAC, but for medical professional and regulatory bodies, so 
these services were able to be introduced without pre-market regulatory requirements.   
 
The literature on the surveillance, introduction, failure and withdrawal of harmful or ineffective testing 
technologies is comparatively small (Faulkner, 2009). Although decisions about the introduction or removal of 
health care services and medical technologies are ostensibly based on assessment of the evidence of harms, 
benefits and costs, these decisions are as much shaped by how health care is organized, regulatory systems and 
the policy influence of strategic alliances between different implicated stakeholders such as healthcare 
professionals, regulatory bodies, industry groups, and consumers (Faulkner, 2009; May, 2013; Ulucanlar et al., 
2013). As health care providers, consumers and policymakers become increasingly aware of the harms of too 
much medicine, there is a need for more scholarly work on how best to identify and limit the impacts of 
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problematic testing technologies that promote overdiagnosis. For these efforts to be effective, they must take 
seriously the agents, systems and processes that will inevitably be implicated in any change.  
 
METHODS 
Data Sources and Collection 
Systematic searches of relevant databases were undertaken for the period January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2014. 
We identified 114 unique items of which 35 were germane to the topic (Supplementary Table 2). Preliminary 
analysis and secondary searches of these materials identified a further 13 items. When limited to sources or content 
pertaining to policies and events in Australia, a final set of 48 documents was produced (Supplementary Table 3). 
These were downloaded as full-text and manually catalogued.  
 
Data Analysis 
Materials in the sample were subjected to an ethnographic content analysis (Altheide, 1987). Drawing on both 
numerical and textual data, ethnographic content analysis is a qualitative research method for interpreting 
documents to generate insights through an iterative process of testing, revising and refining understandings against 
an emerging timeline and conceptual map (Krippendorff, 2004). Led by Author 2, this cycle of searching, mapping 
and critical analysis continued until new textual materials were not providing substantive new insights. The final 
stage of analysis took place during the course of writing, through discussion between authors while revising drafts. 
To verify our analyses and interpretations, a key informant from the NSW Ministry of Health who was familiar 
with these events took part in an unstructured interview in order to assess, and add context and nuance to our 
findings. A consumer advocate who reported extensively on these services then reviewed our results and 
interpretations as a triangulation exercise, and to give further feedback on research outcomes and our timelines. 
In what follows we draw on these textual analyses, and insider recollections and reflections to begin to map out 
the challenges, pathways and mechanisms for the de-implementation of new screening technologies. The study 
process was approved by the University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics committee. 
 
RESULTS 
Selling the benefits of a full-body CT scan 
At the end of 1998, Toshiba, General Electrical and Siemens all launched competing models of the next generation 
of multi-slice CT scanner with a period of a few weeks. By the early 2000s, enthused by the falling price of the 
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technology and the uptake of direct-to-consumer CT body scanning services in the USA, a handful of medical 
entrepreneurs in Australia bought machines with funds raised though share issues with the aim of offering 
preventive screening services. Promotion of fully body CT scanning in Australia began several months before the 
businesses began to trade and focused strongly on the services’ purported benefits: largely, that the details 
uniquely revealed by this technology would enable individuals to be informed about their state of health, both at 
the time of the scan and into the future. The promotion of this benefit was framed so as to imply that people who 
did not have a full-body CT scan were putting their health at risk (Le Heron & Coakley, 2004), and would be 
unable to make informed decisions about their health. For example, in Australia full-body CT scan providers 
advertised widely in daily newspapers, with slogans such as  
 
In just 30 seconds we might find something your doctor may not find for ten years (Zinn, 2003).  
 
The images obtained were promoted as a ‘win-win’ for informed decision making, regardless of the results, with 
this promise marketed especially to the wealthy and apparently healthy with no symptoms of disease. If the large 
amount of image data from the scan appeared to show that everything was as it should be – a normal result – this 
was a benefit, labelled as ‘peace of mind’ (Le Heron & Coakley, 2004; Teutsch, 2002). If the result was abnormal, 
this was also seen to be a benefit, the promise being ‘improved outcomes’ on the assumption that early intervention 
must be beneficial. The implication was that without the scan, the abnormality or disease may have gone unnoticed 
because there were no symptoms, perhaps until it was too late for a good outcome (Evans, 2003; Le Heron & 
Coakley, 2004).   
 
Opposition, but continued marketing  
In January 2002 – a few months before full-body CT scans became available in Australia – the Royal Australian 
and New Zealand College of Radiologists (RANZCR) issued a statement that there was no evidence that full-
body CT scans were either cost-effective or effective in prolonging life (RANZCR, 2002). Despite RANZCR 
making these concerns public, there was no regulatory mechanism available to stop the roll out of commercial 
services. As noted by a key informant, in 2002:   
…a lot more CT scanners came into Australia … But there were clearly some gaps in both the 
advertising restrictions on those services and then the regulation of the radiation component of 
the services.  (Key Informant Interview) 
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As a consequence, during the first few months of 2002 full-body CT scanning services were widely advertised in 
daily newspapers by at least 3 companies operating from a range of locations in Sydney, the most populous city 
in Australia. These ads portrayed full-body CT scans as a preventive health tool that gave people control over 
their health, with little to no indication of the potential for harm. Just before the launch, Dr Paul Condoleon, a GP 
and company director of a service provider called ProActive Medical Screening, noted in a media interview: ‘It’s 
always better to know if something is amiss...’ (Teutsch, 2002). In the same interview, Condoleon sought to play 
down RANZCR’s reservations about lack of benefit and radiation risks raised by claiming:  
 
There is no evidence of any health problems, these scans are used day in day out…  I think people 
want to be a little more proactive with their health. They don’t just want to go to a doctor and be 
told: ‘there’s nothing wrong with you’. (Teutsch, 2002)  
 
Within a few months, media appearances and advertising campaigns asserting the value of full-body CT scanning 
drew a media response from health professionals and health professional bodies such as the Australian Medical 
Association (AMA) challenging the promises being made—implicitly or explicitly—by the screening services 
(AAP, 2002; Davies, 2002). Spurred by complaints from the AMA, the Office of Health Protection at NSW Health 
referred full-body CT screening service providers to the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), for making 
misleading or false claims in advertising.  At the same time citing the findings of the RANZCR report and rulings 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, spokespersons from the NSW Ministry of Health and AMA raised 
concerns about the widespread uptake of these services leading to increased rates of radiation-induced cancer in 
the community, to try and dissuade people from using the new screening services (Pollard, 2002). There was also 
a direct attack from the National President of RANZCR on the claims being made and anecdotal evidence used 
by the new service providers:   
 
It will always be possible to trot out someone who has had a cancer found early and removed as a 
result of a whole body [CT] scan. That's wonderful for the individual but it hides the statistics 
about people who may have had unnecessary tests and had complications, or who have been 
mistakenly reassured. (Aisbett, 2002) 
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Notably, in these early media stories, environmental health authorities and other government bodies primarily 
focused on the risks of radiation while radiologists and epidemiologists sought to highlight the risks of 
unnecessary medical investigations. The differences in the framing of risk between these positions were matters 
of emphasis rather than conflict. Ruth Pollard, a respected journalist working for Fairfax-owned newspapers, took 
a different tack on this issue. She tended to portray the emergence of self-referred full-body CT scans as a 
symptom of a society heading towards troubling medicalization, asking:  
 
Why are we so determined to see into our medical future? Why would someone with no symptoms 
or suspicion of illness turn to a full-body scan? (Pollard, 2002) 
 
To recap, from the very outset of the introduction of this new fee-for-service offering, there was solid scientific 
evidence of an unfavourable balance of benefits and harms associated with full-body CT scans and consistently 
negative communication from a range of reputable medical authorities emphasizing this evidence. In addition, 
there was social commentary and ridicule as to the types of ‘healthy, wealthy and paranoid’ people who would 
want to avail themselves of such a service (Evans, 2003; Teutsch, 2002). Despite resistance from health authorities 
and a hostile discursive environment, privately-operated screening services began to perform full-body CT scans 
for willing members of the Australian public.  
 
Setting the stage for regulatory actions  
It took more than medical protest and media commentary to achieve successful de-implementation. Restricting 
access to full-body CT scans involved a number of other key people, groups and decision makers, many of whom 
were outside the institutions and practices of medicine, but it took some prompting. The services at issue were 
offered in the state of NSW, but as Table 1 shows, their de-implementation involved several national bodies.  
 
As media attention focused on the medical professions’ response to self-referred full-body CT scanning, the NSW 
Chief Health Officer – the most senior health official for the government of NSW – publicly expressed his view 
that one of the likely consequences of allowing self-referred full-body CT scanning services to continue to operate 
was an increase in radiation-associated cancers in the community (AAP, 2002).  Shortly after full-body CT scans 
became available in Australia, the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council (the expert body established to 
advise the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency on ‘emerging issues’ in radiation protection 
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and nuclear safety) declared publicly that there was no evidence to support the use of self-referred full-body CT 
scans for mass screening. In August 2002, the Council advised that such a service was potentially harmful because: 
“the radiation dose involved is not insignificant” (ARPANSA, 2002). The national Australian government’s 
primary authority on radiation protection and nuclear safety, an organisation with a remit including but beyond 
human health, now officially held a view concordant with the position taken in January 2002 by the RANZCR 
(2002), the key national organization of relevant health professionals.  
 
According to a key informant who held a senior position at the NSW Ministry of Health at the time, a loose 
coalition of government agencies, medical professional and environmental bodies were now aligned against the 
full-body CT scanning service providers. However they lacked a clear and immediate mechanism to stop these 
companies trading.  Senior representatives from both the Health and Environment Ministries met regularly on the 
Radiation Advisory Council (RAC) of the NSW Environment Protection Agency (EPA). During an unstructured 
interview this key informant confirmed:  
A series of discussion on the Radiation Advisory Council that brings health regulators and the 
EPA together - that was where that response about tightening the regulation came from … (Key 
Informant Interview) 
As a statutory authority – a body set up by law – the EPA has primary responsibility for environmental regulation 
in NSW, in areas including waste, pollution, and environmental degradation. They have a broad scope of action, 
including issuing licenses, setting conditions for operation of environmentally sensitive activities, monitoring 
compliance, mounting prosecution, creating environmental policy and educating the public. According to our 
informant, key to the decision to use environmental health regulations to restrict direct consumer access to CT 
scanning technologies was a concern that:  
…the other types of regulatory response we considered might have restricted that valid access for 
patients who needed an investigation (using a CT scanner). (Key Informant Interview) 
To limit mixed messaging and continue to effectively counter any claims of benefit from full-body CT scanning 
service providers, the public face of these actions would continue to be NSW Health. Because of its early role in 
fielding the concerns of stakeholders such as the AMA and RANZCR and bringing the issue of self-referred full-
body CT scans to the attention of other government agencies such as the TGA, the Office of Health Protection 
would act as overseer so that the response was as coordinated as possible. This is arguably the point at which 
effective de-implementation of full-body CT scans began in NSW. 




In September 2002 the then NSW Minister for Health Craig Knowles advised the NSW state parliament that he 
would exercise a legislative lever: that there would be an investigation under the NSW Radiation Control Act 
1990 (Legislative Assembly Hansard, 2002). The objects of this Act included protecting people and the 
environment from exposure to ‘ionising and harmful non-ionising radiation to the maximum extent that is 
reasonably practicable’, considering possible benefits and social and economic factors (Government of New South 
Wales, 1993). Broadly then, this was a set of environmental regulations, and thus a framework for formal 
investigation, designed to focus on allowing radiation exposure only in situations where there was sufficient 
benefit to justify any possible risks. The investigation would assess radiation exposures from CT scan machines 
in use at the clinics offering the service. Based on the findings, the NSW EPA’s Radiation Advisory Council 
would consider and draft a suite of conditions to be attached to licenses for CT scanning machines (Legislative 
Assembly Hansard, 2002). Even though the EPA’s Radiation Advisory Council includes representatives from 
NSW Health, the key regulator in the de-implementation of a service offered in the private health sector was not 
a body primarily charged with the oversight of human health services, but a body charged with managing 
environmental health risks, defined in such a way as to include human radiation exposure.  
 
The NSW EPA finalized its draft conditions in the second half of 2002 (Radiation Advisory Council, 2003). The 
draft was then sent to the Australian Health Minister’s Advisory Council (AHMAC) and the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to obtain advice as to whether the new conditions would 
unnecessarily encumber the use of CT scanning technologies in other contexts and settings. Notably the EPA and 
ACCC are not the authorities through which medical practices are governed in NSW. Even though the NSW 
Health Care Complaints Act (1993) and Australian consumer law could conceivably have jurisdiction over the 
activities of self-referred CT scanning service providers such as Life Span Medical Imaging and ProActive 
Medical Screening, neither the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) or Fair Trading Commission took 
an active role in de-implementation. According to testimony at the Inquiry into the Promotion of False and 
Misleading Health-Related Information and Practices (Committee on the Health Care Complaints Commission, 
2014), ambiguity as to whether self-referred full-body CT scanning for screening could be defined legally as a 
‘health’ or ‘consumer’ service meant that it fell into the cracks between the remits of these two statutory 
organizations, and was therefore unregulated (see Supplementary Table 1). On this basis, a decision was made 
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that the most effective pathway was to change the conditions under which a radiation license holder was legally 
able to operate CT equipment in NSW. 
 
Policy implementation and provider resistance    
In November 2002, the NSW Minister for Health accepted the EPA’s recommendations and would trial them for 
6 months as a first step in tightening the rules around full-body CT scans (see Figure 1). Each recommendation 
covered a different entry point in the process of someone accessing a full-body CT scan. The first 
recommendation—requiring an independent referral—created several barriers. People had to make the time, and 
often an appointment, to see a medical doctor not employed by the CT scanning service provider, and the doctor 
should in almost all cases refuse. The second recommendation aimed to ensure people would be better informed, 
on the assumption that this should diminish demand. Of this the NSW Health Minister noted during a speech in 
the NSW parliament: 
 
At stake in this issue is the right of the consumer to be fully informed and for medical treatments to 
be based on evidence, rather than on hope” (Legislative Assembly Hansard, 2002).  
 
The third recommendation of requiring a declaration of consent from patients was intended to function to force 
people to carefully consider the information provided to them. Together, these recommendations were designed 
to synergistically drive down the numbers of people accessing full-body CT scans, and—if operators did not 
comply—to be only the first step in a tightening series of controls. The NSW Government sent letters to operators 
who advertised full-body CT scans advising that licensing conditions were changing and they had 30 days from 
notification to put the new protocols in place (see Box 1). In a subsequent interview the Health Minister justified 
the government’s response by arguing:  
 
These machines have a place in the medical world, and should be used in accordance with 
professional medical advice, they are not money-making toys. (Pirani, 2002)  
 
When the trial of the amendments ended and they were formally legislated in June 2003, breaches automatically 
became subject to the penalties contained in the Radiation Control Act. Both the Premier and Health Minister of 
NSW took to the media again to inform the public that operators and companies who failed to comply could be 
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fined up to $165,000 AUD and/or imprisoned for a maximum of two years (Anderiesz, Elwood, McAvoy, & 
Kenny, 2004). In these media interviews opponents of the CT scanning services increasingly sought to frame 
users of these services as the “worried well”, a class of hyper health-conscious individuals who would be better 
served by taking their concerns to a General Practitioner. When interviewed about the impact of these changes, 
the director of the rebranded Total Health Screening (formerly ProActive Health Screening) told the media:  
 
It's an absolute overreaction… to try and show the government is potent and actually doing 
something when the health service is a shambles… The level of our Xrays is just the same as 
medical imaging. We regularly detect cancers and a whole range of other conditions patients have 
no idea they have. (Zinn, 2003) 
 
In the Australian Financial Review, the journalist Jill Margo (2003) reported that despite the concerted media 
campaign making sweeping claim of benefits, the uptake of self-referred full-body CT scanning services by the 
Australian public was much lower than in the USA. Now that this source of clients was no longer available, 
service providers sought to stay in business by offering different types of CT scans as alternatives to standard 
screening services. In October 2003, Life Span Medical Imaging advertised virtual colonoscopy and angiogram 
CT scanning as the safer and pain-free option for patients. These activities triggered further responses from the 
NSW Ministry of Health who threatened to refer the company’s advertisements to the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA) because it made significant and misleading claims about the evidence for using CT 
scanning to screen for serious illnesses (Pollard, 2003). According to media reports, service providers had also 
begun to mail and letterbox drop standardized referral forms to people to take to their doctor to sign so that they 
could access the services (Lavelle, 2004). Concerned that too many GPs were succumbing to patient pressure, an 
editorial was published in the Medical Journal of Australia warning their readership of the radiation risks of 
unnecessary CT scans, and the lack of evidence that it was an effective screening technology (Anderiesz et al., 
2004). Unable to generate a volume of referred patients sufficient to sustain a viable business, by the end of 2005 
Life Span Medical Imaging, Heart & Body Scanning and Total Health Screening had all ceased to trade.  
 
DISCUSSION  
The de-implementation of full-body CT scans involved a diverse range of stakeholders exercising varied influence 
and authority within the state of NSW and nationally across Australia. The available evidence suggests that this 
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policy success might have occurred in part because each stakeholder exercised their influence and/or authority 
within their respective remits, while engaging in collective collaborative consultation and communication. In his 
examination of PSA and genetic tests, Alex Faulkner (2012) identified that UK health system regulators have 
employed at least two strategies to manage the risk and uncertainty entailed by different screening technologies. 
For PSA testing regulators relied on ‘responsibilising’ consumers through shared decision making. For new 
genetic and genomic tests, regulators used their epistemic authority to justify restricting access to testing, while 
moderating public expectations of new testing technologies via a media strategy.  In this case, Australian health 
authorities employed a strategy similar to that described by Faulkner in response to genomic testing, with the 
added complication that there was no clear agency or pathway to regulation.   
 
Previous work on medical expertise, institutional jurisdictions and the exercise of power in regulating medical 
activities has pointed to a blurring of the roles of governments, medical professionals, device and drug 
manufactures and consumers – and how this creates markets for individuals who want to assume control of their 
health risks (Hogle, 2002; Petersen, 1997).  In the case of self-referred full-body CT scanning services, these 
forces were resisted through public advocacy and regulatory change. The events described in this study occurred 
against a background of recent Australian health system funding reform.    With debate on the introduction of 
government subsidies for private health care in the background, two opposing social identities for CT scanning 
technologies were being constructed. Both appealed to widely held norms of prevention and avoidance of 
unnecessary risk. Service providers attempted to tap into deeply culturally embedded logics of prevention to 
portray full-body CT screening as a responsible measure that allowed savvy consumers to take control of their 
health and prevent future disease. Drawing on institutional authority, the campaign to counter this framing focused 
on highlighting the long-term risks of unnecessary radiation exposure and questioning the underlying pecuniary 
motivations of service providers and self-obsessions of their customers. Explicitly linking the use of CT scanning 
technologies as a consumer service to the financial interests of the business owners likely reflected the prevailing 
public discourse regarding privatization.  The federal government put in place measures that incentivized private 
healthcare provision (Hall, de Abreu Lourenco, & Viney, 1999), even though public support for maintaining 
funding for the public system was strong (Shiell & Seymour, 2002). Service providers found themselves alone in 
fighting against the move to shut them down – as regulatory measures began to be imposed, there was no public 
controversy, and no natural constituency emerged to defend direct private access to full-body CT health scans.  
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Forming and sustaining policy coalitions among diverse sets of stakeholders can be difficult because of the need 
to balance conflicting values and agendas (Heaney, 2006). However, in this case all policy stakeholders could 
promote their varied interests in service of the same goal: achieving the de-implementation of self-referral to CT 
scanning services. The AMA and RANZCR maintained the position of GPs and radiologists as, respectively, the 
gatekeepers to, and expert interpreters of, diagnostic imaging; the TGA, HCC and EPA fulfilled their public 
mandates by protecting the public, respectively, from misleading medical advertising, unethical medical practices, 
and unnecessary exposure to high levels of radiation. Regulatory changes needed to be justified through 
undertaking a series of reviews and consultations such that medico-administrative processes were instituted 
involving diverse professional and federal and provincial government bodies, including authorities on radiation 
safety (Radiation Advisory Council, 2003; RANZCR, 2002). The aim was to create and validate a body of 
evidence that was robust enough to withstand political or legal challenge. As soon as these reports were finalized 
and tabled in the NSW Parliament, the regulatory loophole was closed through the NSW EPA enacting legislation 
which effected several entry points at which people could access a full-body CT scan.  
 
Attempts by the CT Scanning providers to reframe their offerings as alternatives to established screening services 
were thwarted by the TGA enforcing strict guidelines on the claims made in medical advertising.  In contrast to 
the case of direct to consumer marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United States, CT scanning service providers 
in NSW were unable to sustain claims they were providing meaningful options to responsible health consumers, 
or to authorize themselves in ways that would convince others to accept them (Hogle, 2002). To limit further the 
potential for attempts at market entry in the future, a process was established to develop principles to assess and 
manage new applications of ionizing radiation in medical facilities and other occupational settings (ARPANSA, 
2017).  The final outcome was that full-body CT screening providers could buy the machines – but could not 
successfully embed them in everyday practices. Without direct access to otherwise healthy members of the public, 
providers were unable to legitimate new sets of medical practices, activate a consumer base, or  integrate 
themselves into, and, thereby reconfigure, existing systems (May, 2013). 
 
We began by noting our interest in self-referred access, by apparently healthy people, to full-body CT scans 
because this is very likely to contribute to overdiagnosis.  Full-body CT scanning in Australia is a rare example 
among overdiagnosing technologies: rapidly identified as harmful, and equally rapidly and decisively removed.  
Because our work is based on a single case study, we cannot offer systematic comparative analysis to suggest 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Public Health on 01 Nov 2020, 
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09581596.2020.1841115
  
why this might have been, but we can draw out the characteristics of this case that appeared instrumental to 
regulatory success.  
 
First, since the practice had been condemned internationally before it was introduced in Australia, local authorities 
had an opportunity to take action before it arrived. When full-body CT scanning providers pointed to the 
popularity of this type of service in the USA and sought to reinforce the intuition that individuals can proactively 
prevent potentially fatal diseases by having more information about their health, statutory authorities and 
institutional actors such as the AMA Ministry of Health and ARPNSA were quickly able to draw on scientific 
studies and reports from US regulatory agencies to begin to prosecute a case that the public needed to be protected 
from increased levels of radiation exposure.  
 
Second, the practice involved advertising a service directly to consumers, which not only bypassed the usual 
checks and balances of the Australian healthcare system but perhaps more significantly, created a threat to the 
usual channels of medical professional authority and autonomy. Medical professional bodies sought to reinforce 
their institutional authority, maintaining their position as gate-keepers to diagnostic technologies while reassuring 
the public that CT scanning technologies were safe to use in appropriate circumstances. This was accomplished 
by asserting the importance of clinical expertise in deciding when CT scanning was appropriate, and questioning 
the motivations of the new screening service providers. These providers’ attempts to depict the technology as a 
demand-driven service for health-conscious consumers were scuttled by opponents, who were successful in 
reinforcing the medical identity of CT scanners and publicly positioning the technology as an important but 
potentially dangerous diagnostic tool that required expert hands (Ulucanlar et al., 2013).  
 
Third, within public communications from government and health agency spokespersons, the framing of who is 
at risk from full-body CT scans gradually shifted from ‘healthy people’ to the ‘worried well’.  This media strategy 
moderated the early derision against these services by journalists as ‘yuppie scans’ (at a time when mocking 
yuppies was a well-established national sport), but also effectively sustained an unfavourable discursive 
environment. Finally, because the test was not designed to facilitate early detection of a particular condition (e.g. 
in contrast to the Men’s Health advocacy that surrounds the PSA test) there was no obvious group of suffering 
patients to become a social movement defending the service.  
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From the perspective of de-implementing overdiagnosing technologies, perhaps the most significant thing about 
this particular case, however, was the role of radiation exposure. Most overdiagnosing technologies cause harm 
by exposing people to unnecessary and damaging treatments, which are triggered by, but separate from, the test 
itself. Overdiagnosis mostly begins with tests for biomarkers, ultrasounds, relative simple and low-dose x-rays or 
genome testing (Welch, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2011), investigations that do not physically harm the body at all, 
or not to any great extent. The test is the entry point through which the patient commences a cascade of 
intervention that can cause significant harm, but the test itself is fairly benign – PSA testing being a well-known 
example. Full-body CT scanning was different. The amount of radiation exposure from the test itself was large, 
amplified by the possibility that consumers might attend for multiple scans and so have that exposure multiple 
times. The test itself clearly increased health risk, and it was this risk which mobilised the arguably pivotal agency, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, to act quickly against a practice that was clearly in its remit. Most 
arguments against overdiagnosing technologies rest on the clinical non-significance of the findings and the non-
necessity of the harmful treatments that follow. These arguments were potentially relevant to full-body CT 
scanning too, but they did not provide the main lever for change.  
 
CONCLUSION 
There are several key lessons from this historical case study for efforts to reduce the harms of testing technologies, 
including overdiagnosis. Health technology assessment processes are vitally important, but tend to focus on 
applications of new technologies rather than new applications of existing technologies. This episode shows that 
new applications can be just as dangerous, and need just as much oversight, including assessment of their benefits 
and harms at a population level. Once potential problems do emerge, the role of media becomes critically 
important for alerting people, suggesting a need for ongoing educational engagement with media about the risks 
of overdiagnosis associated with testing technologies. And perhaps most important – and the most difficult thing 
to achieve unless existing institutional stakeholders have their interests aligned – is a strong collaborative 
regulatory, legislative and government response, guided by a combination of good evidence and the precautionary 
principle. As we have shown, full-body CT scanning had the unusual characteristic of being a potentially harmful 
test, as well as being a test that can trigger harmful and unnecessary investigations and treatments. Our appraisal 
(later confirmed by our informants) is that the health risk posed by the test itself motivated implicated stakeholders 
to effect de-implementation. Opponents to the introduction of the new service were able to construct a public 
profile for CT scanning technologies that was nuanced to distinguish between self-referred and medically 
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indicated applications. The key intervention was to mandate the need for a referral and an informed consent 
process.  Once medical professionals were the gatekeepers to customers, service providers had limited ability to 
reshape consumer expectations or established clinical pathways. Future research focused on other comparative 
case studies will provide better understanding of how feasible de-implementation is when the test itself is 
relatively benign, consumers and advocates are strongly invested in access to the technology, or both.    
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Figure 1: The Environmental Protection Authority’s recommendations for licensing the use of CT equipment as 
accepted by the NSW Government*  
 
1. Operators will require [a patient to have] a referral from an independent doctor for a full body CT scan 
2. All patients are to be fully informed about the risks and uncertain value of a full body CT scan. They are 
to be given a clear explanation of what the scans are both capable of detecting, and perhaps more 
importantly, are not capable of detecting. 
3. Should patients wish to proceed with a full body CT scan, they are to sign a declaration stating they have 
received the advice but wish to proceed.  
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Supplementary Table 1: Key Australian stakeholders in the de-implementation of full body CT scans 
ORGANISATION DESCRIPTION MAIN ROLE(S) 
Health professional bodies 
RANZCR 
The Royal Australian and New 
Zealand College of Radiologists 
http://www.ranzcr.edu.au/ 
Professional college for clinical 
radiologists and radiation oncologists in 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. 
Training, professional accreditation, 
continuing professional development, 
policy, advocacy, quality and standards, 
research activities. Promote clinical 
radiology and radiation oncology.  
Australian Medical Association 
https://ama.com.au/ 
Professional association for Australian 
doctors and medical students (all 
specialties). 
Advocacy, influence, professional resources, 
member benefits, workplace advice, 
professional networks. Does not regulate or 
certify doctors.  
NSW Cancer Council 
https://www.cancercouncil.com.a
u/ 
Non-profit state cancer organisation 
(has branches in every state and a 
National umbrella organisation)  
Leading cancer charity focused on support, 
research funding, advocacy and fundraising. 
National Health and Medical 
Research Council 
https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/ 
Australia’s leading scientific authority 
on health and medicine.  
The major national publicly funded 
competitive research-granting institution for 
health and medicine; also provides 
authoritative health advice.   
Regulatory bodies 
Radiation Health and Safety 
Advisory Council of the 
Australian Radiation Protection 
and Nuclear Safety Agency 
https://www.arpansa.gov.au 
The Australian Federal Government’s 
primary authority on radiation 
protection and nuclear safety. 
Advise the Australian Radiation Protection 
and Nuclear Safety Agency on ‘emerging 
issues’ in radiation protection and nuclear 
safety. 
NSW Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au 
A statutory authority with an 
independent governing Board. 
Manage environmental issues in the state 
collaboratively with the other two levels of 
government in Australia’s federated system; 
primary responsibility for environmental 
regulation in the state of NSW. 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
https://www.accc.gov.au 
An independent Commonwealth 
statutory authority  
Enforces the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 and a range of additional 





A regulatory agency within the 
Department of Health of the 
Commonwealth Government  
Responsible for regulating the import, 
supply, manufacture, export and advertising 
of therapeutic goods  




Independent statutory body in NSW Established under the Health Care 
Complaints Act (1993), the commission 
investigates complaints about health service 
providers in NSW 
Fair Trading Commission 
http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.a
u/ftw/home.page? 
Consumer complaints service within the 
NSW Government Department of 
Finance, Services and Innovation 
Acts to safeguards the rights of all 
consumers and advises business and traders 
in NSW on fair and ethical practice 
Government bodies, departments, authorities 
NSW Minister for Health The minister responsible for human 
health in the state government of the 
day  
Broad portfolio responsibilities for human 
health, oversees the majority of health 
service delivery in the state, which is co-
funded by state and federal governments  
NSW Chief Health Officer Senior bureaucrat with lead 
responsibility for health matters within 
the NSW public service 
Oversees a range of functions within the 
department responsible for health in the 
NSW government, including health 
protection, epidemiology, medical research 




Advisory and support body to the 
Coalition of Australian Governments’ 
Health Council. 
Increase coordination between state and 
national health ministers and their 
departments. 
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Supplementary Table 2: Data Sources and Search Terms  
 
Data Sources  
PubMed, Factiva, ANZ ProQuest, Informit, AustLii, and Pandora/Trove.  
 
These databases catalog news and popular media reports, advertising materials, websites and online content, 
legal judgements, parliamentary proceedings, peer-reviewed science and medical journals, and government and 
corporate grey literatures.   
 
Search Terms 
“full body CT scan*”; “full body scan*”; “whole body CT scan*”; “whole body CT screen*”; “whole body 




Supplementary Table 3: Ethnographic Content Analysis Sample Characteristics   
 




Examples of advertorial in newspaper print media General public 2 
Examples of articles in newspaper print media General public 18 
Examples of articles on national broadcaster website  General public 2 
Examples of articles on newswires  General public 2 





Examples of articles in consumer news magazine General Public 1 
 
Medical and scientific literature 
 
 
Research articles in peer-reviewed medical journal Medical practitioners 2 
Editorials in peer-reviewed medical journal Medical practitioners 1 
News article in peer-reviewed medical journals Medical practitioners 4 
News articles in online medical news website  
Medical practitioners 
Medical researchers 
Regulatory agencies 1 
College or association newsletters  
Medical practitioners 
Regulatory agencies 1 
Report by medical research institute  
Medical practitioners 
Medical researchers 
Regulatory agencies 1 
 
Government, court and health agencies  
 
 
Parliamentary Hansard NSW Parliament 2 
Report by statutory agency 
Regulators 
Professional associations 3 
Legal ruling  
Regulators 
Professional associations 1 
Health agency webpage 
General public  
Regulators 
Professional associations 4 
Private Individuals  
 
 
Examples of activist websites / Blogs  General public 2 
Examples of letters to newspapers  General public 1 
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Supplementary Table 4: Full body CT scans summary timeline 
Jan 2002 The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists took the position that there 
was no evidence to justify recommending full body CT scans.  
Apr 2002 Full body CT scans became available in Australia. 
Aug 2002 The Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council took the position that there was no 
evidence to support full body CT scans. 
Sep 2002 The NSW Chief Health Officer ordered an investigation under the Radiation Control Act 1990 
to assess radiation exposures in CT machines being used and inform an assessment by the 
NSW Environment Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA proposed draft suite of conditions to 
be attached to licenses for CT machines (Box 1).  
Nov 2002 The NSW state government accepted the EPA’s recommendations and instituted a 6-month 
trial of the new licensing conditions.  
Jun 2003 The new licensing conditions are legislated within the NSW Radiation Control Act 
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